Concerned Local National (CLN) Timeline
|12-Feb-07||Notes from DIV Meeting with General Petraeus||Key Point 5 of 12: We cannot kill our way out of an insurgency; we must get the tribes and populace on our side.|
|16-Apr-07||FRAGO 21 to OPORD 07-02 (OPN Orange Justice)||Discusses discontent between Sunni Insurgent Groups (SRG) and AQIZ.|
|Recent operatinos have created a window of opporutnity to exploit the diverging ideals of SRGs and AQIZ.|
|Use CMO to drive the wedge.|
|Identify SOIs that can influence SRGs|
|Do not side with or cooperate with SRGs|
|Influence SRGs to join the government.|
|Facilitate establishment of Home Guard Organizations|
SJA: REVIEW GROUND RULES ESTABLISHED BY EACH RESPECTIVE TASK FORCE WHEN
IMPLEMENTING HOME GUARD
PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT AO GREYWOLF.
|Direct engagement is not authorized unless specifically approved by BDE CDR.|
ICW leaders of 1920’s, have established definitive areas where each
“home guard” group operates, plotted them on FBCB2, and have
exchanged radios to have communications with them IOT be able to clear ground for ground and AWT engagements.
Within the next 7 days, we will have completed a company and BN (-)
clearing operation in Old Baqubah IOT set the conditions for the
1920’s to come in behind us and conduct the same operations they have in Buritz and Tahrir. They have said that they have as many as 150 personnel ready to conduct operations in OB. They will then conduct recruiting there for locals to join the IP specifically for OB.
|13-Jun-07||1-12 CAV OPORD 07-02 (CHARGER ARROW)||
Key Task: Synchronize operations with indigenous forces
|Key Task: Conduct Buhriz Election if conditions allow|
This side of the 1920’s force has absolutely no intention nor the
ability to “go it alone” prior to our operations in MMK. They will be
to provide sources at our time of choosing to assist us in identifying hot spots and specific locations of IEDs and AQ in the area.
Once Tahrir and Buritz are 100%, they will focus on Old Baqubah. We
have been going in with their sources and pulling out AQ, but
they will not have sufficient force to leave “stay behind” security until they can pull their guys out of Tahrir and Buritz.
|Used to help clear areas of AQIZ|
Commanders, if you plan to hire any local patriots as “security guards”
to help protect key infrastructure in their neighborhoods, then
pay them no more than $37.00 per month…about 75% of what a IP makes. Want them to feel like they are part of the plan but don’t want to discourage them to aspire to become part of the official structure.
|15-Jul-07||Event||ISSUES: THE UNIFORM FOR CONCERNED
LOCAL NATIONALS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, AND, THE ACTUAL UNIFORM
SUPPLIES ARE NOT ON HAND TO DISTRIBUTE.
|17-Jul-07||Daily Tactical Update 31||Coordinate and enforce the below standards for CLC IOT minimize any possible conflict or Blue on CLC fratricide.|
All CLC will take an oath of allegiance to the constitution of Iraq.
Battalions should maintain a signed copy of the oath in the event of a
CLC being detained later for AIF activity.
|All CLC will be BATS/HIIDES IOT operate as part of the recognized force.|
|All CLC will wear and adhere to the standard uniform (see below coordinating instruction).|
|CLC will operate only in their designated neighborhoods/ AOs, unless otherwise coordinated with CF or ISF.|
|CLC will have hiring preference for Iraqi police (coordination with PTT/Doc pending).|
|31-Jul-07||1-12 CAV FRAGO 48 (BUHRIZ RIP) to OPORD 07-03 (CHARGER ARROW)||Key Task: Integrate IA/IP, CLNs and City leaders into the transition.|
|3-Aug-07||Event||CLNs in BG uniform caught stealing, BGs fire them and take their weapons|
|6-Aug-07||Daily Frago 55||Baqubah Guardians (Community Watch Program), Rules, Oath, and Uniform published|
|Micro Rewards Program Extension to Baqubah Guardians and Concerned Local Nationals|
|Discontinue Use of Term “AIF”|
All enemy personnel will be categorized as follows: Sunni Extremists,
Shia Extremists, AQI/ISI, AAS, JAM, or some other specific
threat group. If the specific threat group is unknown use “Unknown Enemy”.
A change in the issuing out of MICRO rewards is all Local Nationals that
are going to receive MICRO rewards need to be entered into
the HIIDES. Also a SF 44 must be turned into SSG Martin for all money spent.
An additional $10,000 in Bn funds is available for Baqubah Guardians
(BG) / Concerned Local Nationals (CLNs). Companies need to
comply with the following IOT receive additional BG / CLN funds: (ii) Report the number of BGs / CLNs, with name and residence to the S2 NCOIC.
|8-Aug-07||1-12 CAV OPORD 07-04 (CHARGER REDEPLOYMENT)||Key Task: Conduct a thorough relief in place that establishes the conditions for immediate success by follow-on unit|
|14-Aug-07||Event||Latent print recovered from the adhesive side of clear tape that was removed from a VOIED pressure switch initiation device 11 Sep 06|
|Match, dude found and detained.|
|14-Aug-07||3-2 SBCT BDE JA Guidance||
The CLN guards must be paid under an MND-N approved contract and not
using CERP/BDA or bulk funds. Contract proposals must
include a statement of work, signed by the crew leader, an approximate number of guards per shift, and a letter of justification from the Battalion commander.
FRAGO 415 (Updated Reconciliation Guidance)
Supersedes FRAGO 220 to OPORD 01-07 MND-N CAMPAIGN PLAN: AL QANOON ASH SHIMALI (NORTHERN LAW)
|Due Weekly: List all BN level SOI engagements and reconciliation efforts|
|1) assist local leaders to get their tribal members to join the IPS.|
|(2) use CERP contracts to provide for critical infrastructure protection forces.|
|(3) use reward funds to encourage individuals to provide
information to CF that leads to wanted individuals or weapons, or
to force protection.
|(4) community watch programs.|
|(5) de-confliction of operations with unofficial armed groups.|
|(6) CERP funded projects.|
|(7) targeted detainee release.|
|(8) access to the GOI.|
|(10) business development assistance.|
|15-Aug-07||Daily FRAGO 65||
Conduct engagements with CLNs IOT determine the best way to provide them
with funds: either using the rewards program and/or
establishing security services contracts. Reference: Appendix 1 (AH6 CLN Financing Guidance) to Annex U (Civil Military Operations) to FRAGO 65
|Report CLN payments at weekly targeting meetings.|
|Only limit I’m placing on you is do not exceed more $240/month…about 75% of a Shurta’s salary of about $329.|
I think that providing some money, in a controlled way, to our BGs (not
just any CLNs) may be a way to improve their ammo problem
(they can buy it themselves), responsiveness, operations and our control over some of their activities and tide some of them over as they wait for IP/IA employment.
|22-Aug-07||AH6 Final Orders||
BGs also state the currently Haji Saad is talking detainees from OB area
into Tahrir for trial and execution. BG also requested US
monies for a new court, to be established in center of OB. BG also states that house squad leader, Abu Abdullah, knows the location of Tahrir court. Recommend using THT to ascertain whether Abu Abdullah or WO Hazm Ahmed Faleh can be used as source to facilitate simultaneous detention of judges.
Inform all the BGs, starting with Dr. Hussein and those named below,
that they will appoint no judges, courts, trials or tribunals of any
sort whatsoever. Those who do this are not Baqubah Guardians but are instead militias and terrorists. If we determine any BGs, 1920s or any such group are having tribunals we will arrest those involved and kill those who resist.
|…you Bn Cdrs will have to sort this out on your own and try to keep this stuff at your level…or we’ll lose the whole BG program.|
|O/A 29 Aug 07||GW6 Priorities Attachment to BDE FRAGO||
1. Reconciliation: Reconciliation between the tribes of Diyala and
between the different sects will continue to be a huge effort for the
Brigade Combat Team. We have already made great strides in this area, and we will continue to work towards the goal of turning the 25 major tribes and over 100 sub-tribes into 1 tribe – the Diyala Tribe.
4. Defeat AQI and prevent the influx of Rogue Militias: We will
continue to attack to destroy AQI throughout the AO. Once AQI is
defeated in an area, we must immediately turn our efforts to restoring essential services and establishing a neighborhood watch in order to prevent other militias from entering the area to fill the vacuum.
|1-Sep-07||Daily FRAGO 82||
Commanders are authorized to provide compensation using CERP funds to
LN’s when occupying privately owned structures, for battle
damage, and to lease strongpoints. Commanders must report the use of CERP funds to the Bn TOC consisting of: Where, When, and Why the funds were paid, to Whom they were paid, and how much was paid out IOT log the Bn CERP use.
|Can use Rewards Program money as part of the Reconciliation process.|
AH6 Guidance: I think that providing some money, in a controlled way, to
our BGs (not just any CLNs) may be a way to improve their
ammo problem (they can buy it themselves), responsiveness, operations and our control over some of their activities and tide some of them over as they wait for IP/IA employment.
|AH6 Guidance: Only limit I’m placing on you is do not exceed more $240/month…about 75% of a Shurta’s salary of about $329.|
|AH6 Guidance: Using Rewards funds to compensate BGs for services rendered that result in captures of personnel and equipment.|
|15-Sep-07||Reconciliation Guidance Brief||Timeline for Temporary Local Security Forces|
|Contracts for Temporary Local Security Forces|
Use of Microrewards to obtain information or non-lethal assistance
leading to the capture of wanted persons or weapons (Cannot be
used for lethal assistance).
|Special detainee release program.|
|Defensive Equipment supplies to CLNs|
|Public acknowledgement of relationship/support of reconcilable group|
|Not authorized: weapons or ammo to CLNs|
|Not authorized: conducting offensive/defensive operations with CLNs|
|Not authorized: providing training to CLNs|
Notes from GEN Petraeus conducted his bi-monthly
|One of the main topics was the state of the CLCs|
|Conclusion: CLCs and Local security forces are critical to achieving sustainable security within each province.|
Local security remains the key to establishing self sustaining security,
as has been displayed in Anbar. GOI Forces external to the
province, initially attempted to control the local populace, but could not create self sustaining progress. Now, local Anbar security will have the ability to replace CF, as they reduce presence in MNF-W. This has been the biggest development in the past six months. While a positive trend, it is much more difficult to achieve in ethnically mixed areas, and ultimately, the Shia led government in Baghdad will have to make some concessions toward reconciliation with Sunnis and Kurds throughout Iraq, as there is no clear political coalition, even within the Shia majority.
|18-Oct-07||Event - General's Visit to Baqubah||We are to find out what the CLC situation is (including reported tensions with IPS/ hiring of CLC for IPS) in Diyala.|
|Questions of whether or not the reward outweighs the risk.|